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of Scotland, thus limiting the problems of defining the study area. Finally, the 
SNP operated in a political system where party labels rather than candidate 
characteristics were generally of paramount importance. 
Community Contextual Factors 
Community activity and beliefs have been considered as a possible influence 
on behavior patterns of inhabitants of a given area. Spatial diffusion processes 
that have been elaborated include the concept of the "neighborhood" effect where-
by the sequence of adoptions of a given product, idea, or behavior pattern is 
1 . 
related to spatial proximity. A particular product or activity, once present, 
will in fact of ten be mostly quickly adopted by those persons closest in space 
to the original adopters. A saturation stage may in fact be reached in the areas 
nearest the originating adopter or adopters while the level of adoption is still 
2 low or non-existent in peripheral areas. This view thus holds that physical 
proximity, an useful surrogate for community in relatively homogeneous societies. 
may be an important component in the spread of adoptive behavior, and such might 
be the case for the spread of some political phenomena. Cox, for example, noted 
that contact between individuals in a political communication network was an 
important influence on the voting decisions of individuals, and such contact is 
a function of intervening distances. 3 It should be noted, however, that such a 
component in political behavior does not stand alone. Clearly, an underlying 
predisposition to accept the political activity in question must exist, although 
the processes by which such behavior spreads could be greatly influenced by 
spatial relationships. 
The effects of spatial proximity or a community context in the idea of a 
neighborhood effect may only be an intervening or underlying variable. Distanc~ 
may reflect the probability and/or intensity of meaningful contact and com-
munication between individuals in the same areas or different ones. Distance is 
thus a surrogate for or component of communication newtorks. On the other hand, 
-3-
direct communication may not be necessary for the spread of such phenomena. 
Voters may be influenced by printed or broadcast information or news items on 
Members of Parliament of a party and decide to emulate the behavior of others in 
the community or other nearby areas in the future. Even visual manifestations 
'that appear during a campaign may be relevant. For example, in West Germany the 
density of bumper stickers favoring a party was found to be positively correlated 
4 
with favorable voter perceptions of different parties. Within wider areas, 
voters may also be willing to emulate previous patterns when such patterns 
occurred in nearby areas where there was a greater perceived similarity of 
issues and conditions than would be the case in areas further distant. 
The idea that contextual factors, including implicitly or explicitly the 
spatial one, might be important if voting behavior has been considered previously. 
Voting support for LaFollette, the Progressive Party's presidential candidate in 
1924, displayed distinctive spatial patterns. In some states his support de-
creased in relatively smooth gradients from a core of strength, and __ urban-rural 
differences as well as differences in social, economic, and occupational 
characteristics were insufficient variables for explaining the differential levels 
5 
of support. The same types of patterns were observed in later years for a 
number of primary election campaigns in American states in which a candidate 
ran for statewide office for the first time. Smoothly decreasing gradients were 
discovered that centered around the candidate's home residence (except when 
another candidate's support centered around his home area and thus led to a 
mixed pattern). This phenomenon, however, disappeared in a candidate's later 
efforts to achieve statewide office. 6 A study of mayoral elections in Indianapolis 
7 directly tested for such spatial effects, but with inconclusive results. Other 
studies of American voting patterns within social contexts have also implicitly 
argued for the presence of a neighborhood effect. Foladare found that working 
class individuals who normaliy had voted Democratic increasingly. voted Re-
8 publican after moving to heavily Republican suburbs. Putnam tested this 
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"suburban conversi.on° thesis in conjunction with tests for the impacts of other 
variables• While he found other factors to be important, he also discovered that 
community influence was an effective input for some groups, including new 
residents. 9 He also noted that the predominant community attitudes could 
inhibit the spread of new partisan beliefs while reinforcing old ones. 10 
Segal and Meyer had similar results in their study of contextual factors in 
the United States.11 
The above studies dealt with elections or voter behavior in the United 
States. It is quite possible that reference group attitudes and locational 
effects might operate differentially or be more important in the United States 
than in other countries. 12 Studies of European voting.behavior, however, have 
had similar results in some cases. In German villages where one party was 
overwhelmingly favored by the voters, individuals who by occupation or economic 
status more of ten voted for other parties had a clear tendency to vote with the 
.. i 13 maJor ty. London in the 1960~ also provided evidence of the "suburban 
conversion" thesis. Cox found that constituencies in the outer ring of the 
Greater London e.l'ea with Conservative majorities maintained these majorities 
even when there was an influx of individuals from areas that had previously 
supported Labour. Cox concluded that either the more Conservative-oriented 
voters were the ones who moved to the suburbs or the new residents were conform-
. 14 
ing to the views of the established residents. Of course, if the voters who 
moved were changing their class status, they might be expected to change their 
party affiliation {although the Liberal Party has often served as a transition 
for persons changing party affiliation rather than the individuals taking the 
route of direct conversion). In one non-voting case, attitudes in the UniteJ 
Kingdom did not show evide~ce of any impact of ~ommunity context or emulation. 
Studies of attitudes of residents toward non-white or New Commonwealth immigrants 
found little evidence to support the idea that attitudes were influenced by any 
contextual impacts or spatial proximity, even in areas with a relatively high 
level of Hew Commonwealth immi rrrllti rm_ lS 
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Some evidence for impacts of community context has been found for the 
areas of the United Kingdom where nationalist parties have been active in 
recent times. Kellas noted the impact of contextual factors in Scotland in 
that if an area is strongly working class, the proportion of working class 
individuals supporting the Labour Party candidate was higher with a con-
16 
commitant decrease in support for Conservative candidates. Another study 
discovered support for community contextual factors in the spread of voting 
support in a spatial context for Wales. Changing levels of support for the 
Plaid Cymru, the Welsh nationalist party, were found to be related to spatial 
17 
relationships and there was an indication that contextual factors were relevant. 
These findings were for the most recent British general elections that were 
used for the present study; therefore, they were quite relevant. While the 
relationships were not tremendously strong ones on the averaget they still 
indicated the possible impacts conununity of context on the spread of support for 
a new nationalist party. Since the Welsh nationalists were clearly the nearest 
analogue to the SNP, it was thus very possible that similar impacts were 
operative in Scotland. 
The previous studies of voting behavior have indicated that community 
contextual factors were at least potentially important in voting decisions. 
Contextual influences, when and if they have been present, cannot be con-
sidered to have been the sole determinant of voting behavior by any means. 
Thus an analysis of possible contextual effects as measured by a variable 
based on spatial propinquity as was the case in the present study could only 
have been expected to find a partial relationship at best. The changing 
levels of support for the SNP through the last four general elections, howevers 
provided an excellent opportunity at least to determine whether the commUi1ity 
context was an operative factor in this area of the United Kingdom. 
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Scots Nationalism and the Scottish Nationalist Party 
Scottish nationalism is not exactly a new phenomenon in the United Kingdom. 
Since the Act of Union a separateness has been maintained between the southern 
and ncrthern parts of Great Britain.. Unlike Wales, which was almost totally 
incorporated, Scot.land maintained a separate legal system, established church, 
educational system, and other distinctly Scottish institutions. Thus, the idea 
of Scotland as a separate entity retained at least a minimum vitality over time. 
The SNP, however, represented a relatively new political manifestation of 
Scottish nationalism. Although there have been previous parties or occasional 
independent candidates who advocated autonomy, home rule, or even separatism, the 
SNP in the 1970s mobilized a large measure of voter support. The Scottish 
Covenant Movement, which was in effect a massive petition drive for a Scottish 
Parliament, was the only preceding effort that attracted major support, and the 
movement eventually lost its momentum. 
The SNP has been in existence since 1925 and has occasionally polled im-
pressive vote totals, particularly in by-elections. Until the late 1960s, however, 
the party was clearly a fringe party with little impact. In early 1967, however, 
the nationalist candidate made a strong showing in a Glasgow by-election. Later 
in the year, the SNP candidate won the by-election in nearby Hamilton. It has 
been suggested that the strong showing in Glasgow gave the SNP as a party a 
greater credibility as a real choice in an election.18 It was a~so possible 
that the by-election vi~tory by the Plaid Cymru candidate in Wales in 1966 was 
an important factor in the SNP's victory in Ham:l.lton since the Welsh outcome 
demonstrated that a nationalist candidate could win. Although the Plaid and 
the,SNP have different goals in many respects, victories by one have strengtl--<ened 
19 
not only the winning party but the other nationalist party as well. This 
probability of mutual interaction and support, while not a community impact, 
does imply the presence of emulative voting behavior. In any event, these strong 
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nationalist showings helped the SNP prepare for the general elections of the 
1970s when the party became an important factor in British politics. 
Val'.iious reasons have been put forward to explain the sudden successes of 
a aeparatist party in a nation which has had a long history of class-based 
political parties. Scotland has suffered along with England and Wales with 
the problems of a declining national economy, and in fact may have been 
harder hit along with Wales. Scotland has also generally had a lower standard 
of living on almost any measure that could be used. Perhaps even more 
importantly, with the British economic difficulties, there appeared to be 
little chance of improvement in these conditions. The resultant failure of 
both of the major political parties to deal with Scottish problems may have 
led to voters switching to the SNP as a protest against the inability of 
British parties to deal with Scottish problems. In fact, it has been argued 
that voters increasingly switched to support of the SNP after Labour took office 
since the Labour Party could no longer effectively be seen as an alternative 
20 that would rectify the "neglect" of Scottish problems. "Whatever the other 
parties might promise before an election, the [Scottish] National Party could 
21 be relied on to put Scotland's interest first." The discovery and opening of 
the North Sea oil fields, which are principally off the Scottish ccast. 
undoubtedly enhanced the awareness of these economic difficulties since a 
potential solution had appeared. Thus, economic factors could have led to 
support for the SNP as a protest against the major parties. Protest voting 
however, is usually a short term phenomenon, and SNP support would nvt have 
survived and grown if protest voting were the underlying cause. Bran.d found 
that the SNP voters maintained their loyalty to the party over time; therefo~·e, 
22 he discounted the protest explanation. The results of the 1979 general 
election, however, may have indicated that the protest' element was present 
and that it simply lasted longer than similar protests elsewhere. 
-8-
Related to the possibility that the support for the SNP was a result of 
protfist voting, was the possibility that the SNP represented the dissatisfac-
tion of the young in Scotland in particular. In effect, the established 
parties, including the Liberals, were seen as inappropriate vehicles for change 
by young voters, again especially after the Labour Party assumed office and 
23 
accomplished no dramatic changes in British society. It was possible that 
the SNP was becoming the party of the p~esent generation just as previous 
generations tended to be Labour or Conservative. Some surveys indicated 
24 that the SNP indeed had disproportionate strength among the young. In fact, 
youthful supporters of the SNP were noticeably among the party's activists in 
25 
many areas. To the extent that the SNP did have an appeal to youthful voters 
and to the extent that cotti~h voters tende~ to adhere to their youthful party 
loyalties, the SNP might have been expected to have a continuing political future 
in Scotland. 
The Scottish economic difficulties and the rise of nationalism has been 
integrated into broader theoretical perspectives. Nairn argued that Scottish 
nationalism (neo-national:f.sm in his terminology) occurred because the decline 
of the British Empire led to a reorientation of capitalism in the United Kingdom 
to the disadvantage of Scotland. In-eluded in the problem was the dominatio11 of 
much of the industry in Scotland by multinational corporations, often 
26 American. Rawkins, in a similar vein, argued that the rise of nationalism in 
Scotland and Wales was related to the displacement of corporate decision-
making away from peripheral areas. Backwardness resulted from "uneven 
development and lack of interest or concern at the center" rather than deli-
berate neglect. Minority nationalisms, as represented by the SNP, thus were in 
' 
a very sense a political response to the creation or formation of sup1a-
. . 27 
national economies. 
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There are some additional £actors that may tave explained some of the 
support for the SNP. While party policy was inchoate at times, there were 
distinct trends that placed ~he party within a broader political spectr~m. 
The party had policy aspects related to populist movements and social credit 
parties in the Commonwealth and Western Europe. It thus had an appeal to 
individuals who were o·pposed to increased size, centralization, and the concen-. 
tration of economic power, either in public or private hands. 28 For the 
1970 general election, the SNP may also have gained votes since it was the 
one party that clearly opposed the United Kingdom's entry into the European 
Economic Community. Various EEC policies would have threatened the well-
being of Scottish fisheries and of some Scottish farmers. Thus, the SNP may 
have attracted some support due to the anti-EEC stands it took. 29 It had also 
been suggested the SNP fared so well as a result of the disorganization and 
weakness of the Labour party in various parts of Scotland. In old Labour 
strongholds~ the party had atrophied and was ill-adapted to facing the 
challenge presented by the nationalists. In addition, the conservatives had 
always been weakly organized. 30 One factor that was not of apparent great 
importance was any desire by Scottish voters for an independent Scotland, a 
stated goal of the SNP. Polls have rather consistently shown that a majority 
of supporters of the SNP did not subscribe to a wish for an independent 
31 
state. 
The above consideration of reasons for the support of the nationalists 
in the 1970s did not indicate that any one cause for the party's rise to 
prominence existed. In fact, it would appear to be the case that a number of 
factors were relevant to the support gained by the party. While no direct 
attempt was made to comment on the various possibilities discussed above, it 
would have been possible for community contextual factors to have an impact 
even if there were one clear cause for the increase in nationalist voting. 
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Contextual factors do not so much explain why support appeared {other factors 
accocnting for its appearance in many cases), but they could aid in explaining 
how support spread to new areas if such a spread was present. In effect, 
contextual factors are more related to the process of political changes in 
voting patterns than to the underlying causes. 
The Analysis 
Parameters of the Study 
The results for the Scottish constituencies for the four most recent 
general elections--those of 1970, February 1974, October 1974, and 1979--
were included in the present study. These elections were the only ones in 
which the SNP ran candidates in at least 65 of the 71 Scottish 'Constituencies. 
Any analysis of earlier elections designed to interpret the impact of commun-
ity contextual factors would have been misleading given the bias induced by 
selective cendidate presentations. By-elections, notwithstanding their im-
portance to the fortunes of the SNP,were not included in the analysis. Per-
sonalities of candidates and local factors could have been more important in 
what often were essentially local contests. The general trend in British politics 
has been for the ruling party to lose gr.ound in by-elections, and minor parties 
33 in the United Kingdom has historically polled better in by-elections. 
General elections, however, when national campaign issues were paramount and 
control of Parliament might be at stake, were more apt to be true indications 
of continuing support given to parties, although there might still have been 
some flucuations due to the quality of the candidates _involved. 
The key measure for the impacts of community contextual effects was based 
on a measure that reflected the spatial closeness of support for the SNP in 
the immediately previous general election. Support was measured in terms of 
the percentage of the vote polled by the SNP candidates in each Scottish 
constituency. These results from the previous election were weighted by the 
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distance from each constituency to the other 70 constituencies in ·Scotland. 
The distance was measured from the major city in a district in the case of 
the more rural areas and geographic centers in the case of the urban voting 
districts. The impact of previous voting for the SNP was assumed to be a 
summation of the constituency vote percentages by constituency in the previous 
general election weighted by the distance between constituencies. The re-
sulting additive measure was assumed to reflect community context with greater 
weight placed on nearby areas. The following formula was used to derive this 
weighted measure of community context. 
c -i 
n=70 
-:: .. ~ 
···,, 
~ ..... ~~ 
........... , ..... 
n=70 
,~ ... ~ .... 
(i/dij) (100.0) 
where Ci = contextual impact on constituency _!, 
d = distance j_n kilometers, and 
V = vote percentage in constituency i in the previous 
general election. 
This measure provided an indication of pro-SNP voting in the previous election 
throughout Scotland. It was weighted by the inverse of the distance since 
prev~ous studies have found such a distance decay function to be operative in 
31. the spread of various phenomena. The measure was divided by the total of 
the distance inverses multiplied by 100% to standardize the figures. Non-
standardization would have biased the measure since some of the Scottish con--
stituencies were much more centrally located in space. In particular, the 
constituencies in the Glasgow area would have had very high absolute values 
given the large number of small, and therefore physica1ly close, constituencies 
in the area. The weighted measure can perhaps most easily be conceived of 
as the modified, contextually relevant percentage of votes given the SNP in 
the last general election with the value varying for each individual consti-
tuency. The higher this average percentage figure, the greater the liklihood, 
it was expected, of the SNP attracting support in the new election if contextual 
\f t i d d 1 i d . i 35 ac ors were n ee re evant to vot ng ecis ans.· 
The percentage figure thus arrived at from the above formula was corre-
lated with a number of other variables. Most importantly, the value derived 
based on the ~revious general election results, was correlated with the current 
SNP vote percentage in each constituency in each of the four general elections 
36 in the study. Since the weighted percentage was based on previous elections, 
the measurement of community context was longitudinally based rather than a 
static measure. Thus, it measured potential political processes rather than 
a simple association. Since the Llberal Party has traditionally favored a 
more decentralized form of government for the United Kingdom, including 
Scotland, the measure was also correlated with the vote percentage of candidates 
of the Liberal Party. The weighted measure was also correlated with the changes 
in the percentages polled by candidates of both parties. Vote percentages 
for the Liberal candidates were potentially more biased since the Liberal 
Party contested a varying number of the Scottish constituencies in the four 
elections. The Liberals did not even consistently present candidates in the 
same constituencies in many cases. The vote levels achieved by the SNP 
candidates in a given election were also correlated with Liberal polls to 
test for any association. Finally, the SNP levels in an election were correlated 
' with the levels achieved during the previous election as an indication of thP 
presence of contextual factors within constituencies as well as between them. 
Even if community contextual impacts were the only operative factor in 
voting decisions (a situation that obviously did not exist), the correlations 
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derived could not have been expected to approach unity. First, the measure 
used did not take into account contextual factqrs within a constituency. 
Obviously, such community impacts could have been great. A relatively isolated 
SNP stronghold would have tended to weight other nearby constituencies relatively 
heavily on contextual impact while the contextual factors on this voting 
district itself would have been understated. Second, the percentage of votes 
received by the SNP might have varied depending on the number of candidates in 
a given electoral district. A Liberal 9 for example, might have attracted some 
potential SNP supporters. The absence of a Liberal might have led to in-
creased voting for the nationalists. The failure of the Conservatives or 
Labour to field a candidate might also had led to tactical voting that could 
have inflated the vote of the SNP in some areas, or even have· deflated it in 
some circumstances. Finally, it is worthwhile to reemphasize that individual 
voting decisions clearly would have reflected other concerns and issues as 
well, and the normal occupational and socio-economic consideration that affect 
·1 
individual voting would also have been operative. 
Results 
The 1970 general election was the first one in which the SNP contested a 
vast majority of the Scottish constituencies. In the preceding 1966 general 
election, the nationalists had candidates in only 23 of the 71 districts, where-
as in 1970, 65 candidates were fielded. Of course, after winning the by-
election in Hamilton, the party did have its lone representative in Parliament 
when the election took place. The weighted vote measure was computed on the 
basis of the 1966 election results, which were of course a selective group of 
constituencies. The average weighted percentage impact from 1966 on the con-· 
stituencies was 4.5%- In the 1970 general elections, the SNP fared reasonably 
well. The average vote per constituency was 11.8%, an improvement over 1966. 
Although the Hamilton seat was lost, an SNP candidate representing the Western 
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37 Isles was elected, thus maintaining the SNP's representation in Parliament. 
The competitiveness of the SNP in 1970 was largely unrelated to the support 
gathered in 1966 (see Table 1 for all results). The change in support for 
Table 1 
Correlation Results 
.!. of Weighted Vote Percentage 
with 
Present SNP Vote Percentage 
Present Liberal Percentage 
Change in SNP Percentage 
Change in Liberal Percentage 
.!. of Present SNP Vote Percentage 
with 
SNP Vote Percentage in Previous 
Election 
Present Liberal Vote Percentage 
Summary Statistics 1 
Average SNP Voze per 
Constituency 
Constituencies Contested 
Average Libera! Vote per 
Constituency 
Constituencies Contested 
Weighted Percentage Vote 
Average for Previous 
General Election 
1970 
.11 
.07 
* 
-.25 
.10 
** .28 
* 
-.22 
11.8% 
65 
6.0% 
26 
4.5% 
General Election 
February October 
1974 1974 
* .24 
*** 
.42 
* .21 
-.07 
*** 
.81 
*** -.41 
22.5% 
70 
8.3% 
34 
10.6% 
* .26 
*** .35 
.03 
* 
-.31 
*** .92 
** -.34 
30.6% 
71 
8.6% 
68 
21.2% 
1979 
*** .50 
.18 
*** 
.43 
-.11 
*** .88 
** -.30 
17.£% 
71 
8.6% 
42 
29.5% 
----------··--··-·--····-·------ --- . -- -·-··--- ---··--· -·- -- ------·· ·--------------·---------'~------
* Significant at the .05 level 
** Significant at the .01 level 
*** Significant at the .001 level 
1There are no significance tests involved for the summary statistics. 
2Average includes zero percent in the uncontested constituencies; therefore, 
the 8.6% gained on the average by the Liberals in 1979 represents much better 
showing in the constituencies that they contested than.does the same 8.6% 
figure for October, 1974. 
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the SNP from 1966 to 1970 was actually negatively correlated with previous 
voting, reflecting in part the presentation Qf candidates in the new consti-
tuencies, particularly in the Highlands area. Support for Liberals was also 
unrelated to the weighted previous support. The vote levels in 1970s however, 
were positively and significantly correlated with support in 1966, and neg-
atively and significantly correlated with support for Liberal candidates in 
1970, even though Liberal candidacies were not as widespread. 
The 1970 general election, thus provided no evidence for community context 
in the spread of support for the SNP except in the limited case of continuing 
and increased support in constituencies previously contested. The limited 
number of consti.tuenc.ies contested in 1966, however, made this first set of 
38 
correlations somewhat problematic in any event. Thus, contextual factors 
that may have been operative could have been partially obscured given the data 
base. 
There were a number of by-elections between the 1970 general election and 
the one in February of 1974. The SNP again had a number of strong showings in 
these contests, and in one case the nationalist won. The continuing appeal of 
the SNP became obvious in the February general election.. Only the Orkney 
and Shetland constituency in the far north remained uncontested. The average 
poll for the nationalist increased to 22Q5%, and seven seats were won. 
Surprisingly, the seat won the by-election was lost, although the SNP candidate 
did come close to retaining the seat. For this election, the nationalist appeal 
did turn out to be strongest in those areas that were nearer the previous areas 
of support as measured by the weighted vote percentage. More surprising, the 
appeal of Liberal candidates was even more closely associated with the level of 
previous SNP support. It would appear that previous support for the SNP generally 
encouraged deviation from normal voting patterns, be it for nationalists or 
~16-
or Liberals. As might be expected, the 1974 vote levels were highly correlated 
with those of 1970 and negatively correlated, at a lower level, with vote 
percentages for the selectively presented Liberal candidates. 
The February 1974 election indicated that community context was a factor 
in explaining increasing support for the nationalists. It also was even a 
possible factor that led to support for the Liberals. As a result, there wes 
the possibility that the two party system was generally losing support in 
Scotland in a rather pronounced fashion. A willingness to vote for other 
parties was obviously spreading from the initial areas of support for the 
nationalists and genera.ting increased support for those parties favoring 
greater autonomy for Scotland. 
In the general el~ction called in October of 1974 because of the lack of 
a party majority in Parliament, the nationalists again improved their showing. 
A candidate was even presented for the Orkney and Shetland constituency (and 
did rather poorly in this Liberal stronghold). The candidates averaged 30.6% of 
the vote per constituency and increased its parliamentary representation to eleven. 
The showing of the SNP candidates in the constituencies won in February, how-
ever, did not generally improve. One might expect that support would have in-
creased in these constituencies since cc:'."i .. :1lmity con textual factors would be moat 
operative, particularly since the nationaliRts had already proven their ability 
to win. In the four constituencies where I1iberal candidates were presented in 
October, having been absent in February, the SNP increased its poll in two 
cases and lost ground in two. In the three cases where there was no change in 
the presence of a Liberal candidates the nationalist slightly gained in one 
case and lost in percentage terms in the two others. The failure of the natio""al-
ists to consistently gain is particularly noteworthy since it has been found 
that in Scotland parties have tended to spend money and make the greatest efforts 
in the constituencies that they hold rather than making the greater efforts to 
win nE?W seats, even those previously lost by a very close vote. 39 
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Notwithstanding these perhaps anamolous results for the seven constituencies 
won in February, support for the nati.onalist was again positively and signif-
icantly correlated with the weighted voting average in February. Again, the 
Liberal appe~l was similarly positively correlated with the previous nationalist 
strength. There was also again a strong positive correlation with previous SNP 
vote percentages and a weakened correlation with the slightly higher Liberal 
vote totals (that reflected in part an focr.eased number of candidates). 
Again, contextual factors as measured by distance relationships had an 
impact. Community attitudes appear to have led to pro-SNP voting as well as 
support for the Liberals. The failure of the SNP to consistently improve its 
vote in constituencies it had previously carried in the first 1974 election 
was surprisingly since collimunity contextual factors should have led to an in-
creased nationalist vote in those areas. Perhaps the failure of the nationalist 
to solidify their support in these areas was an indication of the' fate of the 
party in the 1979 general election. 
The SNP faced the 1979 general election with some pluses and minuses. 
The party had proven that it had the ability to win, and it had surpassed the 
Conservative Party to become the second party in Scotland. In the elections to 
the European Parliament the nationalist candidate for the northwestern district 
of Scotland won and gave the SNP representation at thn supranational level. In 
the referendum on the devolution of powe·~· to a Scottish Assembly, however, the 
party suffered what would have to be considered a defeat. Even though the party 
favored complete independence, devolution of powers would have been a step in 
the right direction. While over half the votes cast were in favor of the 
Scottish assembly, the issue failed to gain the votes of half the electorate b) 
a very small margin. hus~ devolution failed. The impacts of these two 
elections were obviously mixed in relation to the party's strength in the 
general election. 
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The general election that was held in May as a result of the failure of 
the Labour government to win a vote of confidence was a disaster for the na-
tionalists. The SNP again fielded candidates in all 71 constituencies, but the 
average constituency vote fell to 17.6% from the high reached in October of 1974. 
Nine of the eleven seats in Parliament were lost. In fact, the SNP vote per-
centage was lower in 70 of the constituencies compared to October of 1974, even 
in areas where the Liberals also lost votes or did not present a candidate. The 
newly formed Scottish Labour Party had only a marginal impact in this election. 
It presented only a few candidates, and only one drew more than a handful of 
votes. This candidate ran in one of the areas of weakest nationalist support in 
earlier elections; therefore, his impact in the constituency in question was not 
even a major one. Community context did continue to have an impact in this time 
of electoral defeat. The areas of remaining SNP support were highly and 
significantly correlated with such voter support in October of 1974. The 
correlation with the weighted measure was~ in fact, the strongest one found 
for any of the four elections. Support for Liberal candidates was no longer 
significantly correlated with previous SNP support. As in other elections. the 
1979 vote percentages were highly correlated with previous support and re-
mained negatively correlated with Liberal polls. 
The results for 1979 indicated that contextual factors were highly rele-
vant in this period of decline, apparently more so than in the years of 
spreading voter appeal. Of course, there is no reason why contextual factors 
could not have been important in leading to continued support, albeit at 
lower levels, in times of electoral defeat. Nationalist support in 1979 
appeared to have retreated back into its strongholds. The 1979 election did 
provide.the strongest and most unambiguous support for the present of community 
~ 
contextual factors. It also indicated that the nationalist and the Liberal 
appeal had apparently come to a parting of the ways in terms of thEir support as 
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evidenced both by the number of seats won and the fact that Liberal vote 
percentages were no longer associated with previous support for the SNP. 
Conclusions 
Community context clearly did have an impact on the electoral fortunes of 
the SNP in the 1970s given the above results. During the two 1974 elections, 
the presence of nearby previous support for the nationalists appeared to 
facilitate the party's ability to gain new votes. In the period of decline, 
represented by the 1979 general election, the presence of previous support in 
October of 1974 played a role in the party's ability to cut its losses to some 
extent. It would be expected, therefore, that the party would ..2!!. the average 
make its best showings in the future in those areas near its remaining areas 
of strength, mainly in the Highlands and the other constituencies north of 
Glasgow. The nationalists have been consistently weak in Edinburgh, where the 
Liberals have had some strength. They have also been generally weak in the 
Glasgow area, although there have been pockets of support. Whether the elec-
toral fortunes of the party improve. er decline even further in the next general 
election will result from other factors than community context, but community 
contextual impacts will help the party either expand if it is again on an 
electoral upswing or hold some of its remaining support if it suffers continued 
decline. 
It is possible that the support for the SNP was ultimately in the nature 
of a protest vote. After all, in the SNP's rise to prominence in the two 
elections of 1974, the Liberals also seemed to gain by the presence of the 
former support for the nationalists. They held their portion of the vote in 
1979, even though they contested fewer c.o:J.stituencies (thus in effect improving 
their showing since the average constituency vote in Table 1 includes zero 
percentage for noncontested constituencies). Perhaps the ultimate impact of 
the SNP's appearance as a major party in Scotland may be the provision of 
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additional support for the I.iberal arty~ be these new supporters pre.vious 
I 
supporters of the major parties or .former non-voters. The protest character 
of the f.:NP may finally have declined in 1979 as a resul.t of the difficulties of 
the Labour government. The government was a minority government for the last 
part of its term, passing legislation only with the support of the Liberals or 
more rarely the Northern Irish representatives or the Welsh and Scottish 
nationalists. This experience may had led Scottish voters to abandon protest 
and to return to support.of the two major parties and the Liberal Party as a 
better known third choice. 
The preceding analysis, of course, cannot yet be generalized. Community 
context was relevant in the spread of support for the nationalists. Whether 
such an impact is present for nationalist movements in other countries remains 
to be determined. Community context might, in fact, be most relevant for 
support for nationalist or regional movements where a feeling of community might 
logically be more salient. Community context might also be present for other 
parties as well, perhaps including some of the populist movements in Europe 
with which the SNP has some similarities. 
Scotland as a whole, as a periphery of the European "heartland," 
gives scope for comparative work with the other usmaller European 
democracies." Countries of between five to ten million people, with 
a high degree of sophistication of political culture, are an alternative 
model of development to the giant states of western Europe and America. 40 
Finally, community context may also be relevant for major national parties in 
democratic countries that have had shifting areas of strength or have gone 
through periods of decline or increase. 
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